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 Abstract 
 
Proposing far-reaching reforms to the pension systems, the World Bank has recently 
suggested that the existing pay-as-you-go pension systems in many rich as well as 
poor countries, should be replaced by fully funded, mandatory, preferably private 
pensions, as the main pillars of the new system.  It argues that these reforms will 
not only benefit the pensioners, but also enhance savings, promote capital formation 
and economic development.  This paper provides a critical examination of the Bank's 
theses and concludes that it has adopted a one-sided view of the relationships between 
the key critical variables.  The proposed reform may therefore neither protect the 
old nor achieve faster economic growth. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 The World Bank, in an important and influential document 
(World Bank, 1994; hereafter referred to as the Report), has 
proposed far-reaching reforms to the pension systems in both 
developing and developed economies.  Essentially the Bank argues 
that the current pay-as-you-go pension schemes which exist in many 
rich as well as poor countries, are seriously flawed and no longer 
serve the objectives they were intended to promote.  The Bank 
proposes instead fully funded, mandatory, preferably private 
pensions as the main pillar of its new system.  It suggests that 
these proposed reforms will not only be beneficial to the retirees 
and pensioners, but at the same time enhance savings, promote 
capital formation and economic development. 
 
 The Bank's critique of the extant pension systems as well 
as its proposed new pension regime, have been challenged by a number 
of writers.  These contributions have, however, concentrated on 
the social policy implications of the Bank's analysis and 
proposals.  The present paper will briefly review the debate on 
these issues, but its main subject will be a critical examination 
of the Bank's theses concerning the relationship between funded 
private pensions, the development and expansion of the capital 
markets, savings, capital formation and economic growth.  
Although the Bank's recommendations are universal in their scope 
and cover both rich and poor countries, this paper will concentrate 
on the latter where these particular issues are more salient. 
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 It is however important to note at the outset that there is 
a significant potential linkage between the proposed pension 
reforms for the two groups of countries.  Recommendations similar 
to those of the World Bank have been made in the recent period 
for advanced countries by the Swedish Economic Commission chaired 
by Assar Lindbeck (Lindbeck et al, 1994) and the Mortensen Report 
(Mortensen, 1993).  These documents also recommend that the state 
pensions in European countries be largely replaced by privately 
funded pension schemes.  The broader context for these European 
initiatives is the conventional wisdom among orthodox economists 
that the welfare state is responsible for the slow economic growth 
in Europe and that it is necessary to reduce state spending on 
social security in order to revive growth.
1
 
 
 Reisen (1994) has gone further and linked what he regards 
to be the impending crisis of public pension systems in Europe 
with the development of stock markets in the Third World.  He 
notes: "...to safeguard public finances, jobs, and performance, 
                     
     1  Feldstein (1995) is apocalyptic  in his reflections on 
these issues for the US.  He ascribes the decline in the net 
national saving rate in the US from 8 percent in the 1970s to only 
4.5 percent in the 1980s in part to that country's system of social 
security retirement benefits.  He goes on to say that this decline 
in the savings "may not only create lower real incomes and slower 
growth but may weaken capitalism itself.  In the United States, 
a decade of slow growth has increased protectionist tendencies 
in international trade and led to a new interest in industrial 
policies that expand the role of government in guiding the 
direction of technology and of private investment.  In these ways, 
the government policies that discourage saving might make the 
Schumpeterian vision of a shift from private capitalism to a 
government-dominated economy more likely."(pp.399-400)  
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expert reports...recommend unanimously the same: funded pension 
schemes have to be phased in - now!"  In an ingenious proposal, 
Reisen suggests that in order to maximize returns on these 
privately funded pensions in rich countries, their assets should 
be invested on stock markets in developing countries.  The shift 
of pension money from the aging to the emerging markets he argues, 
is, to use the economist's jargon, Pareto optimal: it will benefit 
both the developing countries (through the growth of their stock 
markets as well as a greater inflow of foreign capital) and the 
retirees in the "greying" economies (through higher rates of 
return). 
 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Sections II will outline 
the Bank's analysis of the pay-as-you-go pension schemes as well 
as its proposed new regime.  The social policy critique of these 
proposals will be reviewed in section III.  The Bank's 
propositions with respect to funded private pensions, the 
development of the capital markets and economic growth will be 
closely analyzed in the following five sections.  It will be argued 
here that the Bank's theses in this area are at best of doubtful 
validity.  The proposed reforms may not only be not conducive to 
economic growth, but carry a serious risk of undermining it.  
Consequently, the reforms may not even meet the primary objective 
of providing adequate pensions for the aged. 
 
 
II.  The World Bank's Analysis and Proposals on Pension Reform 
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 The World Bank's Report has two central themes.  The first 
is the stringent criticism of the existing pension systems in both 
developed and developing countries, particularly the latter.  The 
second is the advocacy of the Bank's own preferred system.  The 
criteria by which the Report assesses alternative schemes are 
explicitly set out: 
...that old age security programs should be both an instrument 
of growth and a social safety net. (p.9) 
 
Specifically, it is suggested that these programs should help the 
old by (a) facilitating savings during their active working years; 
(b) redistributing additional income to those who are lifetime 
poor but "avoiding perverse inter-generational and unintended 
intra-generational redistributions"; and (c) providing insurance 
against the many risks to the retirees' pensions.  In addition, 
it is suggested that a useful pension scheme for the old should 
also help the economy as a whole by: (a) minimizing distortions 
in the labour and capital markets and "other hidden impediments" 
to economic growth; (b) being sustainable in the long term in the 
changing economic and demographic conditions; and (c) actively 
promoting overall economic expansion. 
 
 The existing pay-as-you-go systems are condemned on both 
efficiency and distributional grounds.  It is argued that these 
systems often lead to political promises of generous 
post-retirement benefits to workers, leading to high 
contributions, or, as perceived by the workers, high taxes.  This 
in turn leads to tax evasion and switches to informal activities, 
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various other labour market distortions resulting in lower overall 
employment, reduced output and lower labour supply.  In addition, 
these pension schemes are also thought to reduce economic growth 
from what it otherwise could be by failing to increase national 
savings, if not by reducing it.  In short, the Bank claims that 
the existing social security systems have: 
too often produced costly labour and capital market distortions 
and perverse redistributions to high income groups
2
 while 
failing to provide security to the old - outcomes that are 
neither efficient nor equitable nor sustainable." (p.14) 
 
 The pension program recommended by the World Bank's Report 
has a three-tiered structure.  At its core is a defined 
contribution, fully funded, mandatory private pension plan for 
each worker.  This is supplemented by a public pension scheme of 
modest size with the "limited object" of alleviating old age 
poverty and co-insuring against a multitude of risks.  The third 
tier of this system is a voluntary occupational or personal savings 
plan for those who want more income or insurance in their old age. 
 In this scheme the savings function is performed by the first 
tier, the redistribution by the second, and the insurance jointly 
by all three ("since broad diversification is the best way to insure 
against a very uncertain world"). 
 
  
 The Report recognizes that in principle the mandatory funded 
core of the scheme could be either publicly or privately managed. 
 However, private management is preferred on the grounds of much 
                     
     
2
  This is in part because the rich receive larger lifetime 
benefits than the poor because they live longer. 
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higher rates of return achieved by private schemes than the 
publicly managed "provident funds" which many developing countries 
have.  However, the Report goes on to observe: 
Higher returns to contributors aside, mandatory, privately managed 
funded schemes offer economy-wide advantages.  They can be 
part of a national policy to develop new financial 
institutions and deepen capital markets by mobilizing 
long-term saving and allocating it to the most productive 
uses, including uses in the private sector.  For these 
reasons, the report strongly recommends that the funded 
pillar be privately managed. (pp.17-18) 
 
In general, the Report favours privately-managed portable savings 
plans to occupational pension plans established by employers on 
the grounds that the latter lead to labour market distortions and 
can have adverse distributional consequences.  The Chilean 
pension reform initiated in the early 1980s with its privately 
managed mandatory personal saving scheme is commended by the 
Report.
3
  It is essentially put forward as a model for other 
countries to follow. 
 
III.  The Social Policy Critique of the World Bank's Pension Reform 
Plan 
 
 The reform proposals outlined above, as well as similar ones 
put forward in the advanced countries, have, as noted earlier, 
attracted a considerable critical literature.
4
  These writings 
                     
     3  There is a large and growing literature on the Chilean 
model.  For an excellent exposition, see Gillion and Bonilla 
(1992).  See also Uthoff (1993), Ghillarducci (1995), Vittas 
(1992). 
     4  See Atkinson (1995), Beattie (1994), Wolfe (1994), 
Ghillarducci (1995), Gillian and Bonilla (1992), Beattie and 
McGillivray (1995). 
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have questioned the kind of analysis and conclusions embodied in 
the Report on a number of grounds.  Very briefly, these criticisms 
may be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  Many of the shortcomings of the public schemes analyzed by 
the Bank are equally, if not with greater force, applicable 
to private schemes.  Moreover, it is suggested that the 
positive merits of the pay-as-you-go pension schemes in many 
countries, particularly industrial countries (e.g. reducing 
old age poverty, administrative efficiency) have been ignored 
by the Report. 
 
2.  In a detailed analysis of the Chilean pension scheme (the 
Bank's model), Gillion and Bonilla (1992) bring out the risks 
involved for the individual pensioner in such a scheme.  
These risks include the risk of personal misfortune (e.g. 
sickness, invalidity) and the risks associated with 
volatility in the rates of return on investment funds.
5
  In 
the opinion of the two authors, the scheme falls short of 
the standards imposed by the ILO Conventions on Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) and that on Invalidity, Old Age 
and Survivor's Benefits. 
 
3.  It is shown that the Chilean scheme has very high transitional 
costs, particularly for the government.  These have been 
                     
     5  Such financial market fluctuations, which can be quite 
enormous, will greatly effect the retirees' pensions under this 
scheme.  This point is taken up further in the following sections. 
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estimated to amount to almost 5 percent of GDP in recent years 
which most other poor countries would be able to ill afford 
(Uthoff, 1993). 
 
4.  Although the Chilean scheme has 86 percent of the labour force 
affiliated to it, the compliance rate has been poor.  Those 
actually contributing to the scheme have never been more than 
55 percent of the labour force. 
 
5.  The Chilean scheme has adverse distributional effects.  Not 
only is the compliance rate of the rich much higher than that 
of low-paid workers, the rich also earn higher rates of return 
on their investment funds.
6
 
  
6.  The scheme has high administrative costs compared with 
publicly managed provident fund schemes.  These costs 
in the Chilean case amounted in 1990 to 15 percent of 
the contributions and derive in large measure from the 
fund managers' expenses on advertising and sales.  By 
contrast, the corresponding costs in the case of 
Singapore's state-managed provident fund were about 
half of one percent (0.53 percent) of the contributions 
(Vittas, 1993).   
 
7.  The scheme is not only inequitable within social groups of 
the same generation, but unlike the pay-as-you-go systems, 
                     
     6  Vittas and Iglesias (1991). 
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it does not provide for any inter-generational solidarity. 
  
 Beattie (1994) rightly notes that in view of the risks to 
the pensioners and other shortcomings outlined above, "it would 
seem inconceivable that the Bank's pension strategy could be 
justified on social policy grounds."  Thus, if there is a rationale 
for this strategy, it must lie in the additional claim that the 
proposed scheme will enhance economic growth.  The main channel 
through which this is to be achieved is increased long-term savings 
and the expansion and the deepening of the financial markets.  
As the Report notes: 
The mandatory saving pillar can be important for increasing 
long-term saving, accelerating capital market development, 
boosting investment in productive capital, and monitoring 
 corporate performance.  For countries where the current 
rates of long-term saving and capital accumulation are below 
optimal levels, such changes have the potential to enhance 
economic growth.  But the allocation and productivity of this 
capital depend on whether the funds are publicly or privately 
managed. (p.208) 
 
  
 The following sections will closely analyze the supposed 
links between the mandatory pension scheme, long-term national 
savings, the development of the capital market, and long-term 
economic growth.   
 
 
IV. Pension Funds and Capital Market Development 
 
 Essentially the chain of causation implicit in the Bank's 
argument of the relationship between the variables mentioned above 
may be put as follows.  The promotion of private pension funds 
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leads to the expansion and deepening of the equities and bond 
markets.  These developments in turn raise economic growth through 
the following channels: (a) by increasing aggregate savings and 
investments ; (b) by increasing the productivity of these 
investments.  The reasons for (a) and (b) will be explained in 
the next section.  In the meantime we consider here the prior 
question, whether or not private pension funds lead to the 
development of the stock markets in poor countries. 
 
 As Table 1 shows, there has been an enormous expansion of 
developing country stock markets around the globe in the last 
decade or so.  Between 1982 and 1992, the total combined 
capitalization of companies quoted on the emerging markets 
included in the Economist's list rose from less than a hundred 
billion to nearly a trillion U.S. dollars.
7
  The corresponding 
growth in the combined capitalization of industrial countries 
markets was a little more than three fold - from three trillion 
to ten trillion U.S. dollars.  A number of leading individual 
emerging markets (e.g. Mexico, Korea, Thailand) recorded over this 
period a more than twenty fold increase in total market 
capitalization of companies quoted on the stock exchanges.  By 
the early 1990s, the latter figure for many emerging markets, 
whether considered in absolute terms or as a proportion of GDP, 
was greater than that for the average medium-sized advanced country 
                     
     7  See further Feldman and Kumar (1994).  It may be noted 
that the Economist's list of emerging markets includes both Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  However, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in its classification regards both these 
countries as developed markets. 
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markets in Europe (e.g. Sweden, Denmark and Finland). 
 
 In the context of the present discussion, it will be 
appreciated that this huge development of stock markets has 
occurred in most countries without private pension schemes of the 
kind advocated by the Bank.  Indeed, as Vittas (1992) observes, 
"it is fair to say that few, if any emerging equity markets owe 
their impressive performance in the 1980s to the presence or impact 
of contractual savings institutions."
8
   
 
 Nevertheless, it may be useful to reflect here on the specific 
case of Chile, the Bank's exemplar country.  The Report credits 
the pension reform with the development, expansion and deepening 
of capital markets in that country.  Tables 2 and 3 provide 
information on the growth of pension funds and the stock market 
in Chile since 1981.  Table 2 shows that cumulated pension funds 
rose from less than one percent of GDP in 1981 to nearly 40 percent 
in 1992.  Under the Chilean  pension fund regime, the funds (AFPs) 
were allowed to invest in the stock market only after 1985.  
Consequently, as the table shows, there has been a marked change 
since then in the funds' portfolio composition - substitution of 
bonds and bank deposits by equity shares. 
 
 Table 3 indicates that there has been a big increase in the 
volume and value of stock market operations and pension fund equity 
                     
     8  For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the vast 
expansion of stock markets in developing countries during the last 
decade or so, see Singh (1995a). 
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investments in Chile since the mid-1980s.  However, as Uthoff 
(1993) notes, "due to the fact that this  period has been 
accompanied by high and stable GDP growth rates, together with 
important incentives for arbitrage of international interest rates 
causing large capital inflows and currency appreciation, we are 
unable to draw any direct causal effect between pension funds and 
stock market developments."  In support of Uthoff's conclusion, 
it may also be observed that the expansion of equity markets in 
Chile is not out of line with that of other fast expanding equity 
markets in developing countries.  It is equally significant that 
on some other principal indicators of stock market development, 
Chile does not do as well as a number of other emerging markets. 
 Table 4 shows, for example, that the number of listed companies 
actually declined in Chile over the period 1980 to 1992 (from 265 
to 245 respectively) while in India the number rose from below 
a thousand to nearly three thousand. 
 
 The important point here is that if the purpose of the exercise 
is to deepen the stock market, it can be done in many ways other 
than through the development of private pension funds as the 
experience of emerging markets during the last decade shows.  In 
other words, although in Chile private pension funds may have 
helped to some degree in the expansion of the stock market, these 
are in general neither necessary nor sufficient for capital market 
development.  To conclude, therefore, even in the case of Chile, 
the first link in the Bank's chain of causation is far from being 
as strong or robust as the Bank would like the reader to believe. 
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V. Capital Markets and Long Term Economic Growth: Analytical 
Considerations 
 
 Turning now to the second link in the Report's causal chain 
relating private pension schemes to long term economic growth, 
how does the development of stock markets, banks and other 
financial institutions help achieve that objective? Following the 
earlier historical contributions of Goldsmith, (1969), Cameron 
(1976) and Gerschenkron (1962), and the theoretical work of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), there has been in recent years 
a large and a growing amount of research on this subject. One strand 
of this literature, which draws its inspiration from the  
endogenous growth models of Roemer (1989) and Lucas (1988) argues 
that financial intermediation, as well as the stockmarket, helps 
economic growth by (a) increasing the rate of investment and (b) 
improving the productivity of investments
9
. The markets and the 
intermediaries carry out the functions of screening and monitoring 
investment projects, which individual investors on their own will 
find too uneconomic to undertake. These intermediary and market 
functions help diversify systemic risk and enable individuals to 
participate in investment projects which otherwise they may not 
have been willing to do. Thus the economy experiences a higher 
rate of investment than would otherwise have been the case.  
                     
     
9
  For a recent overview of these contributions, see Pagano 
(1993a). 
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Further, to the extent that the financial intermediaries (eg. 
Banks) directly, and the financial markets (through for example 
the take-over mechanism) are actually successful in carrying out 
these monitoring and screening tasks, this should lead to an 
increase in the marginal efficiency of investment.   
 
 In this paradigm the effect of the growth of financial 
intermediaries and financial markets on private household savings 
is ambiguous.   This is because as Pagano (1993a) notes one effect 
of financial intermediation is more efficient risk sharing, which 
depending on  the individual's utility function can have a 
negative effect on his or her savings.  Atje and Jovanovic (1993) 
provide a model in which financial markets have a greater 
stimulating effect on economic growth than financial 
intermediation by the banks.  This is because it is assumed that 
stock markets are more conducive to the development of venture 
capital and hence technical progress than the banks.  Their 
cross-country empirical analysis suggests that countries that 
finance their investments more with equities and less with debt 
tend to grow faster - by a large margin, as much as 2.5% per year. 
 This leads them to enquire why "more countries are not developing 
their stock markets as quickly as they can as a means of speeding 
up their economic development". 
 
 This positive analysis of the effect of stock markets on 
economic growth stands in sharp contrast to the contributions of 
another very important school of thought, which stresses the 
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negative impact of these markets on the rate of investment, the 
time horizon of firms, on international competitiveness, and on 
economic development.  Keynes may be regarded as the founder of 
this alternative view of the stock market.  In a widely known 
passage from chapter 12 of The General Theory, he observed:  "As 
the organisation of investment markets improves, the risk of the 
predominance of speculation does, however, increase.  In one of 
the greatest investment markets in the world, namely, New York, 
the influence of speculation (in the above sense, i.e. 'the 
activity of forecasting the psychology of the market') is 
enormous...Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream 
of enterprise.  But the position is serious when enterprise 
becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.  When the capital 
development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities 
of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." 
 
 It is ironic that the critical school is today increasingly 
influential in the US and the UK, countries with the most developed 
stock markets and where such markets play a critical role in the 
economy.  In the contemporary setting, the basic thesis of the 
school is that even with well organised and complex stock markets 
such as those found in the Anglo Saxon countries, the market does 
not in practice perform at all well its monitoring, screening and 
disciplinary functions.  
 
 The ability of the stockmarket to carry out these tasks 
depends crucially on the efficiency of two mechanisms: (a) the 
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pricing process; and (b) the takeover mechanism (Singh 1992).  
With respect to (a), there is a growing amount of theoretical as 
well as empirical work which suggests that the real world share 
prices, although they may be reasonably efficient in Tobin's (1984) 
'information arbitrage' sense (ie. any new information about a 
stock or the market in general percolates quickly and speedily 
to all players), do not reflect fundamental values. Research by 
this school suggests that the actual share prices generated even 
by the fully developed stock markets of London and New York are 
often dominated by speculators, the so called 'noise-traders', 
by whims and fads, and are therefore not efficient in Tobin's 
'fundamental valuation' sense.
10
 There is also evidence that, as 
Keynes had suggested, investors give disproportionate attention 
to near-term events and therefore do not have long time horizons 
(Miles, 1993). 
 
 This 'short-termism' arising from the pricing mechanism is 
compounded by the failings of the take-over process. Empirical 
studies suggest that selection in the market for corporate control 
does not take place simply on the basis of efficiency (as measured 
for example by rates of return or by stockmarket valuation) but 
also very importantly on the basis of size.
11
 Thus a large 
                     
     10 There is a large literature on this subject. See for 
example, Modigliani and Cohen (1979); Schleifer and Summers 
(1990); Schleifer and Vishny (1990); Nickell and Wadhwani (1987); 
Poterba and Summers (1988). For a survey of the theoretical 
literature, see Camerer (1989). 
     11 Again there are a host of studies on the subject. See among 
others Singh (1971,1975); Meeks (1979); Ravenscraft & Scherer 
(1987); Scherer (1988). For an opposite point of view see Jensen 
(1988). For recent reviews see Singh (1992,1993b). 
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relatively unprofitable corporation has, other things being equal, 
a much smaller chance of being taken over than a small, relatively 
much more profitable firm. A large firm can make itself further 
immune from take-overs by becoming bigger still through the process 
of take-over itself (Greer,1979). Apart from this perverse outcome 
for the take-over disciplinary mechanism, there are both 
analytical arguments and empirical evidence which suggests that 
take-overs themselves contribute significantly to market myopia.
12
 
 
 The economists of the critical school further argue that these 
failures in the pricing and take-over mechanisms and the consequent 
short-termism, puts the stockmarket dominated US and UK economies 
at a competitive disadvantage with respect to countries like Japan 
and Germany. In the latter two countries, the stock markets, for 
historical reasons, have not been so significant in relation to 
industrial development. It is also notable that neither Japan nor 
Germany  have a market for corporate control in the Anglo-Saxon 
sense of hostile take-overs, leveraged buy-outs, etc.
13
 
 
 To sum up, the above analysis suggests that even with well 
organised and complex stock markets, such as those existing in 
the US and the UK, the stock market is unable to perform well its 
disciplinary and allocative tasks.  An important implication of 
                     
     12  Cosh, Hughes & Singh (1990); Froot, Scharfstein & Stein 
(1990); Stein (1989); Singh (1995a). For an alternative 
perspective see Marsh (1990). 
     
13
  See further Mullins and Wadhwani (1989); Odagiri and Hase 
(1989); Singh (1995b).   
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this view is that the stock markets in developing countries would 
fare even worse in these respects.  This is because these countries 
do not yet have the accounting standards, or possess in sufficient 
numbers information gathering and disseminating private firms  
or public organisations of the kind found in developed countries. 
The share prices in these emerging markets are therefore likely 
to be dominated by noise and speculation.  Moreover, there will 
be relatively few firms with a long enough track record and 
reputation for the stock markets to be able to evaluate their long 
term prospects sensibly.  Hence, these markets are expected to 
exhibit much greater volatility than the advanced country markets. 
 It is suggested that in these circumstances the monitoring, 
screening and disciplining functions of the stock markets are 
better and more efficiently performed by financial intermediaries, 
i.e., the banks.
14
   
 
 A central analytical weakness of a stock market system with 
respect to the finance-industry relationship, industrialisation 
and long term economic growth is that it provides the individual 
investor with more or less ready liquidity.  This is usually 
regarded as a virtue by the exponents of the stock market.  As 
Mr. John Tagino, a former head of global equity trading at Merrill 
Lynch put it in relation to the global equities market for leading 
corporations: ` (it) gives the customer the ability to have instant 
liquidity at any time of the day or night, he or she wants it'.
15
 
                     
     14  Tirole (1991) makes this argument most persuasively in 
relation to the transition economies of Eastern Europe. 
15.  Quoted in Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1992). 
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 However this `liquidity' also means that the investor need 
have no commitment to the long term future of the firm.  The 
bank-dominated financial systems are by contrast far better able 
to ensure such long term financial commitment to their client 
corporations.  Moreover, unlike the small individual investor in 
a stock market system who has no incentive to gather the costly 
information to supervise and discipline managers in management 
controlled large corporations, the banks have both the incentive 
and capacity to subject corporate managers to much more stringent 
supervision.  The German-Japanese types of banks are thus able 
to cope far better with the problems of asymmetric information, 
agency costs, transaction costs than the Anglo-Saxon stock market 
system.
16
 
 
 In the light of this important analysis of the critical school 
outlined above, the World Bank's assertion of an unequivocal 
positive relationship between capital market development and 
economic growth must be viewed with some scepticism. 
 
 
VI.  Stock Market Volatility and Economic Welfare 
 
 Stock market prices tend to fluctuate more than other economic 
variables even in fully developed markets.  However, a high degree 
                     
     
16
  There is a huge literature on this subject.  For a recent 
review see Allen and Gale (1995). 
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of volatility is a negative feature of a stock market in that it 
can undermine the financial system as a whole; it also makes share 
prices much less useful as a guide to the allocation of resources. 
 Moreover to the extent that they discourage risk-averse savers 
and investors, stock market fluctuations may raise the cost of 
capital to corporations.  After the 1987 stock market crash, 
several enquiries were undertaken in the United States (e.g. the 
Brady Commission) to see whether as a result of financial 
liberalisation and global trading, or the introduction of new 
technology and devices such as programme trading, stock market 
volatility on the U.S. market has increased, and how in any case 
it can be reduced.  Evidence however indicated that volatility 
on the US market in the 1980s was much in line with the long term 
historical record; it was in fact less in the last decade than 
in the 1930s (Schwert, 1989).  Nevertheless it remains a cause 
for concern and several proposals were put forward to reduce share 
price fluctuations, e.g. suspension of share trading if the stock 
market index falls by more than a specific percentage in a trading 
period. 
 
 However, as predicted by the critical school, the capital 
markets of developing countries exhibit much greater volatility 
than those of advanced economies. Singh (1993a) provides evidence 
on this issue for the 1980s. His data showed, for example, that 
between 1984 to 89, the standard deviations of monthly percentage 
changes in share price on the emerging markets were considerably 
larger than those on the US, the UK or the Japanese stock markets. 
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Singh also reported that between 1982 and 1985, share prices on 
the Brazilian stock market rose five fold (in US dollars terms); 
two years later they dwindled to twenty eight per cent of their 
1985 value. In the first nine months of 1987, share price on the 
Mexican stock market rose six-fold.  However, following Black 
Monday in October 1987, prices fell to a tenth of their pre-crash 
level.  In Taiwan, the largest Third World stock market, between 
1987 and February 1990, the share price index rose by three hundred 
and thirty per cent to reach a peak of 12,600; the index then fell 
to a quarter of its value (3160) by September 1990.   
 
 To take a more recent case, the Financial Times reported on 
18 September 1995 that  
 The Nigerian stock market All-Share index has doubled from 
2,205 at [the] start of this year to 4,400 in early September. 
 In the first eight months equities increased in value by 
105 per cent  in dollar terms, helped by a steady exchange 
rate.  Although the economy is in recession and previously 
sound  companies are struggling to stay in business, the rise 
in share prices coincides with unprecedented interest from 
both domestic and offshore investors. 
 
 A partial devaluation of the naira at the start of the year, 
inflation of over 80 percent, negative interest rates and 
fears of bank failure have persuaded many Nigerians that the 
stock market is the best place for their savings. 
  
 
 In the circumstances, the Nigerian share price boom would 
appear to be a speculative bubble which is likely to be pricked 
sooner rather than later, and thereby contribute considerably to 
share price volatility on that market.  Davis (1995) has provided 
quantitative information on comparative  volatility of share 
prices in the mature and emerging markets for the period 1976-1991. 
 He reports that during this timespan the monthly standard 
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deviation of share prices was over 30 percent in Argentina, 18 
percent in Brazil, and 17 percent in Taiwan compared to 5 percent 
for the USA and Europe and 7 percent for Japan. 
  
 At an analytical level, the issue of stock market volatility 
is salient to the question of the welfare implications of the stock 
market versus bank-based financial systems.  It of course bears 
directly on the question of the riskiness of the size of pensions 
the retirees may expect to receive under the private pension plans. 
 In formal economic models, Allen and Gale (1995) have demonstrated 
that the bank- based systems are much better than the stock market 
systems for intertemporal risk sharing; the latter on the other 
hand are superior with respect to cross-sectional risk sharing. 
 As Allen and Gale observe: 
  An illustration of the differences between the two 
financial systems in terms of their ability to smooth 
risk is provided by the experience of the 1970s and the 
1980s.  In the U.S., the real value of the stock market 
approximately halved after the oil shock of the early 
1970s and stayed at this level for the rest of the decade. 
 Households that had provided for retirement by 
investing in the stock market and needed to liquidate 
shares in order to pay for consumption were forced to 
reduce their standard of living substantially.  By 
contrast, in the 1980s the stock market approximately 
doubled in real value and the process was reversed; 
households whose savings were invested in the stock 
market were able to increase their consumption 
substantially.  The important point is that these U.S. 
households bore substantial consumption risk over the 
two decades. 
 
  The U.S. experience can be contrasted with that of 
Germany over the same period. German households save 
for retirement and other purposes primarily in bank 
accounts and other debt-like instruments.  Although 
Germany also experienced an oil shock, the value of these 
savings was not halved.  German investors were able to 
consume the amount they had planned as banks drew on 
reserves to maintain payouts.  In the 1980s there was 
a sustained boom in Germany as in the U.S.  During this 
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period the value of household's savings did not 
increase, since they were held in the form of fixed 
claims on the intermediaries.  The intermediaries, 
however, were able to build up reserves.  In contrast 
to the U.S. case, we could argue, households did not 
bear as much risk from their savings because of 
intertemporal smoothing by intermediaries. (p.190) 
 
 
 It may be argued that pension funds, because of their long 
term liabilities, are more likely to behave like banks rather than 
short term liquidity traders or speculators.  In principle, it 
is true that institutional share ownership should lead to long 
term value maximization and to "patient capital".  However in 
practice, analysis and evidence from both the US and UK suggest 
that because of the particular structural features of 
institutional fund management, the opposite situation prevails. 
 Fund management is a highly competitive industry and increasingly 
the performance of fund managers themselves is assessed on the 
basis of short term results.  This leads to high share turnover, 
acceptance of takeover bids on the basis of short term financial 
gain rather than long term industrial logic.
17
 The latter 
behavioral pattern is also connected with the phenomenon of 
"asymmetric payoff".  It is pointed out that there are sound 
reasons for fund managers to display a "herd" instinct: if a fund 
manager who decides not to follow the "herd" turns out to be wrong 
in his investment policies when the herd is right, he or she may 
be subject to severe penalties, e.g may lose his her job. On the 
other hand if the herd is wrong and the fund manager is right, 
the pay-off may not be as great - it will usually take the form 
                     
     
17
  For a fuller discussion of this argument, see Cosh, Hughes 
and Singh (1990).  See also Singh (1995b). 
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of a promotion or pay-rise. Thus faced with the prospect of an 
immediate stock market gain from a "takeover situation", the fund 
managers are more likely to accept it than not. 
 
 
 It may further be objected that despite the theoretical 
advantages of bank-based over the stock market-based financial 
systems, and the empirical evidence from rich countries in support 
of these propositions, the experience of developing countries, 
including Chile, with bank-based systems has not been a happy one. 
 It is certainly true that in many less developed countries, 
bank-based systems have functioned unsatisfactorily and have not 
promoted economic growth.  In a number of countries experiencing 
a high degree of macroeconomic instability, bank-based finance 
has tended to degenerate into inflationary/inefficient finance. 
 Singh (1993a) calls attention to the following serious 
shortcomings of such systems in the developing country context: 
 
(a)  "crony capitalism", which leads to the diversion of financial 
resources to particular individuals and families with political 
connections, instead of such resources being used to promote long 
term industrial development; 
 
(b)  industry-finance links of the bank-based type can in 
principle, and sometimes in practice, lead to monopolistic 
positions in product markets and thwart entry by new firms, thereby 
hindering efficient industrial development; 
  
 
 25 
 
(c)  imprudent or inadequate government regulations of the banks 
has sometimes jeopardized the integrity of the financial system 
as a whole (for example Chile, following financial liberalization 
in the early 1980s). 
 
 
 Thus, although bank-based systems are much to be preferred 
in principle to the stock market-based systems, the developing 
countries should pay particular attention to questions of proper 
regulation and to the prevention of monopolistic abuse by the 
banks.  After the debacle of the Chilean banking system in the 
early 1980s, what was required was prudential regulation of the 
bank-based system rather than the expansion of the stock market, 
because of the capacity of the former to foster finance-industry 
relationships which are conducive to long term investment and 
economic growth.  
 
 
VII. The Capital Market, Corporate Finance, Savings and Investment 
  
 In the light of the foregoing discussion, we turn to the  
core issue in the World Bank's claim that their proposed pension 
system will not only "protect the old" but also "promote growth". 
 Does the development of the equities and bond markets lead to 
a rise in national savings and investments?  For this purpose we 
shall first examine the relevant data on corporate finance for 
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developed as well as developing countries.  
 
 Table 5 gives figures on the financing of physical investment 
for non-financial corporations in Germany,Japan, UK and US for 
the period 1970-1989.  In the context of the present discussion, 
the important point which emerges from the table is that the equity 
market's net contribution to investment needs of the non-financial 
corporate sectors both of the US and the UK was negative over this 
period.  What this indicates is that corporate new issues in these 
two countries were more than matched by a net redemption of 
corporate shares (mainly because of takeovers).  In Germany and 
Japan, although new issues made a net positive contribution to 
corporate investment over the period considered, it was extremely 
small and amounted to no more than 2 to 3 percent of the total. 
 
 Table 5 also indicates that in all four industrial countries 
in the sample, the main source for financing corporate growth was 
`retained earnings'.  To the extent that the companies use 
external funds to finance their investment needs, in almost all 
countries, except the US, bank finance was the most important 
source of outside funds. 
 
 At a theoretical level, it may be observed that this pattern 
of corporate financing for the advanced countries - in which the 
firms seem to prefer retained earnings to debt, and both of these 
to new share issues (the so-called "pecking order" pattern of 
finance) is compatible with rational profit maximisation by the 
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firm.  Current models of corporate finance, based on theories of 
asymmetric information, agency costs, transactions costs, etc. 
can rationalise the observed "pecking order" in terms of normal 
profit maximisation by firms without invoking any managerial 
theories of the firm (Myers, 1984). 
  
 Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995a) have recently 
provided among the first systematic large-scale studies of 
corporate finance in developing countries.  Table 6, extracted 
from Singh (1995a) gives information on the financing of corporate 
growth for the hundred largest listed corporations from ten 
industrialising countries during the 1980s.  These data show that 
the top developing country corporations finance a very small 
proportion of the growth of their 'net assets' (i.e. long-term 
capital employed by the firm) from internal sources.  The median 
Korean corporation in the top hundred financed only a little over 
15 percent of such growth from internal sources during the 1980s 
(and the rest from external sources).  The corresponding figure 
for the median top Thai corporation was a little less than 15 
percent, for the Mexican 23 percent, for the Turkish 13.4 percent 
and for the Malaysian a little less than 30 percent.  Compared 
with the internal financing proportions for advanced countries 
these would appear to be very low figures indeed.
18
 
 
                     
     
18
  The information for advanced country corporations in 
table 5 is based mainly on flow-of-funds data.  The results are 
not therefore strictly comparable with those for developing 
country corporations presented here.  See further Singh (1995a). 
  
 
 28 
 Similarly, the data in column 4 show heavy use of equity 
finance by large developing country corporations to finance their 
growth of net assets.  For all countries together, the median top 
developing country corporation financed more than 40 percent of 
its 'net assets' growth from new share issues.  For six of the 
nine countries in the table, equity finance accounted for more 
than 35 percent of the growth of net assets of their biggest 
corporations.  Even though, for data reasons, the equity financing 
proportion for some countries may be overstated (for example 
Turkey), these figures are orders of magnitude higher than those 
for the advanced country corporations (in table 5). 
 
 The extensive resort to the stock markets by developing 
country corporations is regarded by the exponents of the stock 
market as important evidence in support of the view that these 
markets benefit industrialisation and development.  It is, 
indeed, true that unlike in the advanced countries, in the stock 
market boom of the 1980s and 1990s, the market has been a genuine 
source of new finance for corporate expansion in developing 
countries.  However, the important question is whether the fast 
growth of the stock markets in these economies has led to an 
increase in aggregate savings.  Or is it the case that what has 
happened is simply the substitution of one form of saving (say 
bank savings or government bonds) for another (purchase of 
corporate shares on the stock market).  There is little or no 
evidence of an increase in aggregate savings for the sample 
developing countries as a result of the growth of the stock markets 
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or of greater new-issue activity on these markets.  In some of 
the countries (e.g. Turkey, Malaysia), the aggregate savings 
actually fell during the 1980s.  Moreover, it is worth noting that 
in the advanced countries, the aggregate savings ratio in the stock 
market dominated economies of the US and the UK is much lower than 
in Germany and Japan (where, as noted earlier, the stock market 
has only a peripheral role in relation to industrial development).  
 
 Similarly, there is little evidence that stock market 
development in the last decade or more in developing countries 
has led to an increase in aggregate investment.  Evidence for 
India, for example, shows that despite the boom conditions in the 
stock market in the recent period and hence the reduction in the 
cost of capital, corporate investment in fixed assets actually 
declined (Nagaraj, 1994). 
 
 Private pension schemes can in principle lead to a rise in 
aggregate savings, not just through the development of the capital 
market, but also directly. The empirical evidence on this issue 
is mixed and is far from being robust (Atkinson, 1995).  In this 
connection, it is useful to examine the specific  case of Chile. 
 Table 7 provides the relevant data.  The table shows a fall in 
total savings and investment over the period 1980-1991.  There 
are, however, no clear trends and it is best to be agnostic.  It 
would certainly not be valid to conclude from this evidence that 
pension reform has led to a rise in national saving and investment 
in that country. 
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VIII.  Foreign Portfolio Investment 
 
 It was noted in the introduction that Reisen (1994) has 
proposed that to cope with the pension crisis arising from rapid 
aging, the old industrial countries should stimulate private 
funded pensions and seek maximum returns on pension assets.  He 
suggests pension managers can reap big diversification benefits 
- a `free lunch' in the form of a superior combination of risk 
and return - by investing in the emerging stock markets of the 
younger economies.  He estimates that if OECD pension assets were 
invested according to world stock market capitalization, around 
$655 billion dollars would have been held in 1992 in the emerging 
markets (rather than the estimated $11.5 billion dollars).  He 
therefore proposes that to attract these pension and other 
institutional funds developing countries should abolish exchange 
controls and other impediments to free capital flows.  Similar 
advice has been given to developing countries by a WIDER Study 
Group (WIDER, 1990) under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Berrill. 
 The World Bank Report also favours foreign portfolio 
diversification by pension funds, although it recognizes some of 
its negative aspects.  Nevertheless, it feels that its star pupil, 
Chile, was "too cautious" in not permitting AFPs to invest abroad 
until 1991.    
 It is indeed true that there is considerable scope for foreign 
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portfolio diversification in developing countries by pension funds 
in industrial countries.  Singh (1993a) reported that the 
correlation between share price movements in the Third World and 
those in advanced countries were generally low; for some emerging 
markets the correlations were negative during the period 
1984-1989.
19
  It is of course possible that as the world capital 
markets become more and more integrated, the share price movements 
in emerging and developed markets would become more highly 
correlated.  This however, does not seem to have happened so far.
20
 
  
 
 Nevertheless there is a serious negative side to the foreign 
portfolio diversification which does not seem to have been given 
sufficient attention.  Briefly, first, the abolition of capital 
controls will make the national economy much more vulnerable both 
to international macroeconomic fluctuations as well as to capital 
flight.  Further, in view of the destabilising feedbacks between 
the financial and the currency markets, it will make the task of 
exchange rate management, and hence of inflation, much more 
difficult.  Secondly, stock market volatility could "ceteris 
paribus" also adversely affect aggregate investment in the 
economy.  In addition, for reasons explained earlier, stock market 
development may damage industry-financial relationships and harm 
investment, competitiveness and the real economy.  Thirdly, it 
is important to note that if the proposals are adopted, most of 
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  See also Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1992). 
     
20
  See Feldman and Kumar (1994) and Mullin (1993). 
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this portfolio investment is likely to go to a small number of 
the most developed Third World economies with large corporations 
and relatively well organised stock markets rather than to a 
majority of the poor countries. 
 
 The WIDER Study Group argued that fostering stock market 
development will among other things discourage capital flight and 
in fact bring flight capital back since the market gives wealth 
holders an attractive alternative vehicle for domestic investment. 
 This argument is plausible but deceptive.  This is because 
capital flight is essentially a consequence of financial and 
macroeconomic instability; of course in turn it also exacerbates 
such instability.  The existence of a stock market per se is 
unlikely to help in this respect.  In unstable economic 
conditions, stock market volatility on the contrary could enhance 
financial instability and in fact lead to capital flight not least 
by foreign portfolio investors.  The aforementioned negative 
consequences of portfolio investment in emerging markets are 
forcefully brought home by the debacle on the Mexican currency 
and stock markets at the end of 1994.   
 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
 The analysis of the previous sections has shown that the World 
Bank's proposed pension plan is not only flawed in terms of social 
policy, but it is far from certain that it will enhance economic 
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growth.  Each of the links in the chain of causation relating 
pension funds to capital market development, and the latter to 
economic growth can be seriously questioned on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds.  The Bank has adopted a one-sided view, 
without much justification, of the relationships between these 
critical variables.  Therefore, its proposed reform may neither 
protect the old nor achieve faster economic growth.  On the 
contrary, the reform may contribute towards undermining growth 
while also exposing pensioners to greatly enhanced risks 
concerning the size and real value of their pensions.  
 
 None of this is to deny the serious difficulties faced by 
the existing pension systems in both rich and poor countries.  
However, the root and branch changes of the kind suggested by the 
Report are not the only way of reforming the system, let alone 
the best way.  Serious consideration should be given to the more 
balanced plans of the kind suggested by the ILO, which 
realistically confront the problem of pension reform while also 
adhering to minimum social standards.
21
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  See, for example, Gillion and Bonilla (1992). 
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    Table 1. Market Capitalisation of Traded Equities 1\ 
             (Billions of US $, and Percent of GDP)   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                            
                               1983                                           1992           
                                                                    US $ (bill.)   Percent of 
GDP                US $(bill.)   Percent of GDP                             
Latin America     
Argentina 1.4 1.3 18.6 8.2 
Barbados na na 0.3 16.4 
Brazil 15.1 7.4 45.3 11.7 
Chile 2.6 13.2 29.6 78.1 
Costa Rica 0.1 3.8 0.5 7.7 
Columbia 0.9 3.1 5.7 11.6 
Jamaica 0.1 2.8 3.2 100.7 
Mexico 3.0 2.0 139.1 43.0 
Peru 0.5 2.6 2.6 5.6 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1.0 12.8 0.5 9.2 
Venezuela 2.8 3.5 7.6 12.4 
Uruguay -- -- 0.4 3.5 
East Asia     
China na na 18.3 4.2 
Honk kong 17.1 70.8 172.1 177.0 
Korea 4.4 5.3 107.4 36.2 
Philippines 1.4 4.3 13.8 26.2 
Singapore 15.5 89.2 48.8 106.0 
Taiwan 7.6 14.5 101.1 48.9 
South Asia     
Bangladesh 0.05 0.4 0.3 1.3 
India 7.2 3.5 65.1 26.7 
Indonesia 0.1 0.1 12.0 9.3 
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Malaysia 22.8 76.1 94.0 163.3 
Pakistan 1.1 3.7 8.0 15.8 
Sri Lanka na na 1.4 14.5 
Thailand 1.5 3.8 58.3 55.4 
Europe/Mid.E
ast/ Africa 
    
Cote d`Ivoire 0.3 4.4 0.3 na 
Egypt 1.1 3.0 2.6 6.2 
Greece 1.0 2.9 9.5 12.0 
Iran na na 1.2 0.1 
Jordan 2.7 56.7 3.4 73.9 
Kenya na na 0.6 7.5 
Mauritius na na 0.4 13.2 
Morocco 0.3 2.1 1.9 6.6 
Nigeria 3.0 3.7 1.2 4.5 
Portugal 0.1 0.5 9.2 10.9 
Tunisia na na 0.05 0.3 
Turkey 1.0 2.0 9.9 8.9 
Zimbabwe 0.3 4.8 0.6 8.2 
Largest 
Industrialised 
Countries 
    
Canada 141.0 42.8 243.0 42.7 
France 38.1 7.2 350.9 26.5 
Germany 82.6 12.6 348.1 17.9 
Italy 21.0 5.0 115.3 9.4 
Japan 565.2 47.6 2399.0 65.4 
UK 225.4 48.9 838.6 79.8 
US 1898.1 55.7 4757.9 78.8 
Source: Based on IFC Emerging Markets Data Bank and International Financial Statistics 
/ Data are for end of period `--' indicates capitalisation less than US$ 10 million; `na' indicates 
data not available. 
  
 
 41 
* table continued from previous page. 
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                Table 2. 
                PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION OF PENSION FUNDS IN % (CHILE) 
              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    Year   Central      Bank     Mortgage   Firm   Common   Funds    
   Funds 
                             & Treasury deposits securities    bonds  stock        mill.US$ 
  % 
                             bonds        & bonds                &      %           
equivalent  GDP 
                                                                                debentures 
              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                   1981          28         62           9           1          0        
219                    0.9 
                   1983          44          3          51           2          0       
1223                    6.4 
                   1985          43         23          36           2          0       
2228                   10.9 
                   1987          42         28          21           3          6       
3570                   15.5 
                   1988          35         30          21           6          8       
4370                   16.5 
                   1989          42         21          18           9         10       
5388                  19.7 
                   1990          44         17          16          11         11       
7316                 26.5 
                   1991          38         12          13          13         24      
10078                34.4 
                   1992(jun)  37         10          13          12         28      11922 
               38.1 
                                                 projection 
                    2000                                                                      
                              49-54 
                    2010                                                                      
                              77-87 
                    2020                                                                      
                              88-109 
                   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   Source  Uthoff (1993).   
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                           Table 3. 
                           STOCK MARKET AND PENSION FUND PORTFOLIO 
                           ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                        Common stock                       Pension Funds 
                           Year  Price      Volume of    Market             Common 
stock 
                                   index      traded         value (US          (US$ 
millions) 
                                                index          $ millions)                 
                          --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           1981         105       592         5000                 - 
                           1983           70       369         2783                   
                           1985         100       100         2919                 - 
                           1987         313       908         6852                 223 
                           1988         425      1094         8438                354 
                           1989         581      1372        11375               545 
                           1990         750      1155        14564               806 
                           1991        1682      2651       27706               2406 
                           1992(jun) 2122      3177       34444              3347 
                          ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                          Source Montt, Deigo 1992.The Chilean Private Fund System. 
                                  Superdentcia de Adninistradoras de Fondas de Pensiones.   
                                                          Workshop on "Emerging Markets, 
Current Issues", Bolsa de                                                       Comerico de 
Bunes Aires, 23-24 Nov. and Uthoff (1993). 
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  Table 4. 
  Number of Listed Companies in Emerging Markets 1981-1992 
 
Korea 343 334 328 336 342 355 389 502 626 669 686 688 
Pakistan 311 326 327 347 362 361 379 404 440 487 542 628 
Thailand 80 81 88 96 100 98 125 141 175 214 276 305 
Jordan 72 86 95 103 104 103 101 106 106 105 101 103 
Mexico 229 206 163 160 157 155 190 203 203 199 209 195 
India 1031 1106 1151 1295 1529 1912 2095 2240 2407 2435 2556 2781 
Turkey   --   --  -- 373 -- 40 50 50 50 110 134 145 
Malaysia 187 194 204 217 222 223 232 238 251 282 321 366 
Zimbabwe 62 62 60 56 55 53 53 53 54 57 60 62 
Chile 242 212 214 208 228 231 209 205 213 215 221 245 
Brazil 477 493 505 522 541 592 590 589 592 581 570 565 
 
  "--" implies that data is not available. 
 
 Source  International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook,  
         1990 and 1993. 
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                                     Table 5. 
                                     Net Sources of Finance- 1970-89: Germany, Japan, UK, 
US 
                                     (percentages) 
                                     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          GermanyJapanUKUS 
                                      Internal80.669.397.391.3 
                                      Bank  
                                      Finance11.030.519.516.6 
                                      Bonds-0.64.719.517.1 
                                      New Equity0.93.7-10.4-8.8 
                                      Trade Credit-1.9-8.1-1.4-3.5 
                                      Capital  
                                      Transfers8.5 - 2.5- 
                                      Other1.5-0.1-2.9-3.8 
                                      Statistical  
                                        adj.0.00.0-8.0-8.7 
                                     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                     Source Corbett, J. & Jenkinson, T. (1994) "The 
Financing of                                                               Industry 1970-89: 
An International Comparison" Centre                                                         
     of Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 948. 
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                                   Table 6. 
                                   All sample countries: top listed companies in 
manufacturing 
                                   Financing of corporate growth(1): after tax retention 
ratio(2), 
                                   and internal and external financing of growth: median 
values 
                         
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                         Country         Retention       Internal     External     External 
                                            Ratio            Finance     Finance      
Finance 
                                            (%)             (%)        Equity (%)   Debt 
(%) 
                         
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Korea            65.7             15.8               46.9        
     3.0 
                           Pakistan         65.9             67.5                5.2         
   23.9 
                           Jordan           48.0             54.8               25.5         
   5.8 
                           Thailand         48.7             14.7               n.a          
   n.a 
                           Mexico          n.a               23.1               64.7        
   1.0 
                           India             68.0             38.1               16.3        
    38.9 
                           Turkey           37.8             13.4               66.6        
    38.9 
                           Malaysia         51.7             29.7               48.0        
    12.0 
                           Zimbabwe       61.7              57.0               43.5        
   0.0                                                              Brazil             98.3   
          46.0               37.2             5.6 
                           All                62.9             32.0               41.1       
     16.0 
                       
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       (1)Growth is measured from the beginning to the end of the relevant   
                                          period. 
                       (2) Average values, normally for the period 1980-90. 
                        
                        Source Singh (1995a). 
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      Table 7. 
      SAVINGS & INVESTMENT IN CHILE 
      (% of GDP) 
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Year      Pension     Private     Total     Public    National     Foreign    Total 
savings 
                  Savings     Savings     (1)        Savings  savings       savings    
=Investment 
                                other Private          (2)       (3)=(1)+(2)  (4)    (5)= 
(3)+(4)                                   savings                                             
                                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      1980          0                 2.8          2.8         11.0      13.8      7.1      
  21.0 
      1981         0.9               -1.8         -0.8          8.6       7.8     14.3       
 22.0 
      1983         1.7                8.2          9.9         -4.5       5.4      5.7       
 11.0 
      1985         1.8                8.6         10.3         -0.8       9.5      7.8       
 17.3 
      1987         2.1                6.4          8.5          4.1      12.6      4.3       
 16.9 
      1988         2.7                6.0          8.7          7.6      16.3      0.8       
 17.0 
      1989         3.1                6.3          9.4          7.9      17.3      3.0       
 20.3 
      1990         3.3                8.5         11.8          5.5      17.3      3.0      
  20.2 
      1991         3.3               10.9         14.3          4.9      19.2     -0.3      
  18.8 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Source Uthoff (1993).         
        
             
                                                                
 
                                  
 
